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FUNDAMENTAL CORPORATE CHANGES:
AMENDMENTS TO ARTICLES, MERGER AND
CONSOLIDATION, ASSET SALES AND
DISSOLUTION
INTRODUCTION
In 1968, the Kentucky General Assembly directed the Legislative
Research Commission to study and evaluate Kentucky's present
corporate, business and taxation laws and to recommend desirable
changes. As a result of this study, Kentucky's future corporate policy
was stated as follows:
Kentucky, in order to foster economic growth, shall encourage mod-
em business enterprises and corporate organizations to locate in
Kentucky and minimize the loss of corporate and business orga-
nizations to other states. This can only be done by enacting laws
that provide the freedom and flexibility needed by modem corpora-
tions.'
On July 1, 1972, the "Kentucky Business Corporation Act" [here-
inafter cited as the Kentucky Act], essentially a pro-business act,
became effective. The act produces numerous modifications in Ken-
tucky's corporation law, and this article will endeavor to emphasize
key changes relating to amendments to articles of incorporation,
merger and consolidation, asset sales and dissolution.
I. AMENDMNTS TO ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION
A. Right to Amend Articles of Incorporation: (KRSA § 271A.290)
It was in 1819 that the famous Dartmouth College case 2 enunciated
the doctrine that the charter of a corporation is a contract between
the state and the shareholders and thus entitled to the protection of
the contracts clause of the United States Constitution prohibiting the
states from enacting any law impairing the obligation of the contract.
As a result of the Dartmouth College case the states began to insert
clauses to alter, amend, or repeal in the charters which they granted
1 KENucKy LEGISnATrvE REsEAncH COMMIssION, INFORmATIoNA BULL. No.
76, LEGIsr.ATTvE ANG: CoR'oATION LAw i (1969).2 Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
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in order to avoid the constitutional limitation.3 It is now well estab-
lished that these reservation clauses are not repugnant to the grant of
powers and privileges, but are a valid limitation on them.4 This is
because corporations are the creations of the state, endowed with such
faculties as the state bestows and subject to such conditions as the
state may wish to impose.5
The charter of a corporation may be amended under statutory
authority. 6 Kentucky provided this prerequisite statutory authority
in Kentucky Revised Statutes [hereinafter cited as KRS] § 271.4457
under the old law and in Kentucky Revised Statutes Annotated [here-
inafter cited as KRSA] § 271A.290 of the new act.8 KRSA § 271A.290
of the new act is similar to the old KRS § 271.445 in permitting a
corporation to amend its articles so long as the amendments contain
only provisions that would be allowable in the original articles of
incorporation. 9 KRSA § 271A.290, however, is much more specific than
prior Kentucky law in providing the general powers of amendment
of a corporation.'"
Some concern may be anticipated as a result of the broad powers
of amendment provided for in the new act, more specifically in sub-
sections (j), (p) and (k) of KRSA § 271A.290.1 KRSA § 271A.290(j)
allows the articles to be amended "to create new classes of shares
having rights and preferences either prior and superior or subordinate
3 In most states today, the power to amend corporation laws and charters
granted pursuant to such laws is reserved in the general corporation law or in the
state constitution. See, e.g., Ky. CONST. § 3.
4 Citizens' Say. Bank v. Owensboro, 173 U.S. 636 (1899); Deposit Bank v.
Daviess County, 39 S.W. 1030 (Ky. 1897), af'd, 173 U.S. 663. See Annot., 62
A.L.R. 573 (1929).
5 See 18 Am. Jur.2d Corporations § 92 (1965).6 Randle v. Winona Coal Co., 89 So. 790 (Ala. 1921).
7 Ky. REV. STAT. § 271.445 (1971) [hereinafter cited as KRS], was super-
seded on July 1, 1972 by the KFNTucxe Busmss Col,'oarnoN Acr which is
modeled after the ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. Corn'. AcT (rev. ed. 1969).
8 Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 271A.290 (Supp. 1972) [hereinafter cited as KRSA].
9 For examples of amendments not allowed because they could not lawfully
be contained in the articles of incorporation, see State v. Jefferson Lake Sulphur
Co., 178 A.2d 329 (N.J. 1962) (escheat provision inconsistent with escheat
statute); Bowman v. Armour & Co., 160 N.E.2d 753 (IMI. 1959); cited in H.
HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF COrpORATiONs AND OT=mi BusNESs ENTER-
PLUSEs 708, n.1 (2d ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as H. HENN, LAw OF CoaPioR-
TIONS].
10 The general power of amendment provision in the new act is KRSA §
271A.290(1). KRSA § 271A.290(2)(a)-(p) enumerates particular amendments
a corporation may make but provides that they are not all inclusive and do not
limit the general power set forth in KRSA § 271A.290(1).
11 KENTucKY LEGISLATIVE REsEABcH COmmlsION, INFOnMATIONAL BULL. No.
88, LEcISLATIvE HEARNG: COnPORATION LAw 13-14, 18-19 (1971) [hereinafter
cited as LEGISLATIVE HEARING].
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and inferior to the shares of any class then authorized, whether issued
or unissued." KRSA § 271A.290(p) allows amendment "to limit, deny
or grant to shareholders of any class the preemptive right to acquire
additional or treasury shares of the corporation, whether then or
thereafter authorized." KRSA § 271A.290(k) allows amendment "to
cancel or otherwise affect the right of the holders of the shares of
any class to receive dividends which have accrued but have not
been declared."
These provisions (j, p and k) could have some effect on share-
holders' "vested rights"' 2 although there is a class voting procedure
contained in KRSA § 271A.800 that may offer some protection. Also,
it appears that a stockholder's preemptive right to purchase addi-
tional shares, a right which accrues on the date the shareholder buys
into the corporation, may be taken away from him by a simple
majority vote in favor of amendment of the articles of incorporation. 13
It has been suggested that such a provision might be held uncon-
stitutional because it is a deprivation of one's property without due
process of law.14
The general concept that vested rights cannot be impaired or
destroyed under the reserved power of the legislature to amend or
repeal corporate charters has not been uniformly followed by the
courts. In Clearwater v. Meredith,15 a case which appears to be un-
favorable to the constitutionality of KRSA § 271A.290 subsections (k),
(p) and (j), the Court held that the charter of a corporation con-
stitutes a contract between it and its stockholders and also between
the stockholders inter sell which is entitled to protection against at-
tempted action by the corporation. As an example of case law which
tends to support the constitutionality of the questioned sections, in
Mobile Press Register, Inc. v. McGowin'7 it was held that where
statutory provisions authorizing changes in stockholders' rights (by
less than unanimous shareholder vote) are in effect when one pur-
chases stock in a corporation, such person takes his stock subject to
the condition that it may be altered in the manner authorized by
12 MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT. ANN. 2D § 57 IT 2 (1971). Vested rights are said to
be rights which are complete and consummated and of such character that they
cannot be divested without consent of the person to whom such right belongs.
13 KRSA § 271A.295.1 4 LEsGISLrE HEAyING, supra note 11, at 13-14, 18-19.
1r 68 U.S. (1 Wall). 25 (1863). Accord, Schaad v. Hotel Easton Co., 87
A.2d 227 (Pa. 1952); Schaffner v. Standard Boiler & Plate Iron Co., 83 N.E.2d
192 (Ohio 1948).
36 Thompson v. Fairleigh, 187 S.W.2d 812 (Ky. 1945).
17 124 So.2d 812 (Ala. 1960).
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statute.' 8 The stockholder is deemed to consent in advance to the
making of such changes as the statutes permit if they are designed to
enable the corporation to conduct its business in a more profitable
manner.'
9
How will the Kentucky courts construe these subsections of KRSA
§ 271A.290? The broad powers to amend conferred by the Kentucky
Business Corporation Act 20 are based upon provisions of the Model
Business Corporation Act.21 The official comments of the Model Act
state:
2
The broad power to amend... is intended to lay at rest the 'vested
rights' doctrine which originated with the United States Supreme
Court decision in the Dartmouth College case....
One of the major purposes of the Model Act was to sweep aside
the complexities of judicial decisions on vested rights which were
increasingly handicapping the conduct of business through the
corporate form.
The general language of the first sentence of [KRSA § 271A.290] 23
is intended to have universal application and is not narrowed by the
succeeding enumeration. The latter is included solely to rebut
any presumption of 'vested rights'.
Based on the above precedents and the pro-business policy of the
Kentucky Act, the Kentucky courts should uphold the constitutionality
of subsections (j), (k) and (p) of KRSA § 271A.290.
B. Procedure to Amend Articles of Incorporation; Class
Voting on Amendments: (KRSA §§ 271A.295; 271A.800)
Amendments of the articles of incorporation are always governed
Mobile Press Register, Inc. v. McCowin, 125 So.2d 812 (Ala. 1960).
Accord, Midland Truck Lines Inc. v. Atwood, 241 S.W.2d 903 (Mo. 1951). If
the corporation could not amend its articles of incorporation to comply with the
changing business world, the corporation would be ill prepared to contend withits competitors.
' Sherman v. Pepin Pickling Co., 41 N.W.2d 571 (Minn. 1950). Accord,
O'Brien v. Socony Mobile Oil Co., 152 S.E.2d 278 (Va. 1967), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 825; Western Foundry Co. v. Wicker, 85 N.E.2d 722 (IM. 1949); Anderson
v. Int'l Minerals & Chem. Corp., 67 N.E.2d 573 (N.Y. 1946).
20 KRSA § 271A.290.
21ALI-ABA MODEL Bus. CoRP'. Acr (rev. ed. 1969).
2 2 MODEL Bus. CoP. Acr ANN. 2D § 58 1 2 (1971).
23 (1) A Corporation may amend its articles of incorporation, from time to
time, in any and as many respects as may be desired, so long as its articles of
incorporation as amended contain only such provisions as might be lawfully con-
tained in original articles of incorporation at the time of making such amendment,
and, if a change in shares or the rights of shareholders, or an exchange, reclassifica-
tion or cancellation of shares or rights of shareholders is to be made, such pro-
visions as may be necessary to effect such change, exchange, reclassification or
cancellation.
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by the law of the jurisdiction of incorporation. 24 KRSA § 271A.295 is
Kentucky's procedural provision for amending the articles. It provides
that the amendment procedure is initiated by a board of directors'
resolution setting forth the proposed amendment. This differs from
the old law under which there was no requirement that the directors
initiate amendments. The old act provided that amendment procedures
must be taken by the shareholders unless no shares had been issued,
in which case the incorporators could then act in place of the share-
holders.25
After the board passes the amendment resolution, it is then sub-
mitted to the shareholders26 for approval. All amendments require
the affirmative vote of the holders of a majority of the shares entitled
to vote thereon. 27 However, if any class of shares is entitled to vote
as a class, the vote must be of at least a majority of the shares of each
such class and of the total shares entitled to vote thereon. 28 Further,
the holders of the outstanding shares of a class are entitled to vote as a
class upon a proposed amendment, whether or not entitled to vote
thereon by the articles of incorporation, if the amendment would
materially affect their rights.2 19
Although KRSA § 271A.295 contemplates a vote by shareholders
at an annual or special meeting, .(RSA § 271A.665 permits any corpo-
rate action to be taken by the unanimous written consent of the share-
holders in lieu of a meeting. Furthermore, KRSA § 271A.295 (1) (a)
authorizes amendments to the articles solely by action of the board of
directors if no shares have been issued.
It should be remembered that the Kentucky Act does not preclude
a corporation from providing in its articles for a larger percentage
vote, but it would be inconsistent with the act for the articles to
authorize amendment by less than the statutory minimum vote.30
Also, even though given the right to voice disapproval, the shareholders
objecting to an amendment of the articles of incorporation are
afforded no appraisal remedy by the Kentucky Act.31
24 H. HENN, LAW OF ConPorlToNs 712.
25 KRS § 271.445(2).
26 At either an annual or special meeting.
27 KRSA § 271A.295 (shareholders must either adopt or reject amendments
submitted by the board of directors; they can not revise them).
28 KRS § 271.445(3). The old law required a two-thirds vote of each class
affected.
29 For situations in which the shareholders' rights are deemed to be materially
affected see KRSA § 271A.300(1)-(10).3 0 MODEL Bus. Con'. Acr ANN. 2D § 59 II 2 (1971).
31 H. HEN, LAw OF CORPORATIONS 710.
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C. Articles of Amendment: (KRSA § 271A.805)
KRSA § 271A.805 of the Kentucky Act supersedes KRS §§ 271.450
and 271.455. The new act provides for a simpler form of articles of
amendment, and as a result, conformance with its statutory require-
ments should not be difficult. Attention, however, should be given to
KRSA § 271A.305(4) and (5).
Subsection (4) provides that in the case of an amendment initiating
an exchange, reclassification, or cancellation of existing shares, the
manner of effecting this change must be stated in the articles of
amendment if not set forth in the amendment text itself. Subsection
(5) states that if an amendment alters the amount of stated capital,
a statement in the articles of amendment concerning the manner in
which the alteration is effected, and the dollar amount of stated
capital as changed by such amendment, must be set forth in the
articles of amendment. The purpose of these requirements is to
prevent confusion which might arise if the amendments do not indicate
on their face how capital structure changes are to be effectuated.3 2
D. Filing of Articles of Amendment: (KRSA § 271A.810)
The Kentucky Act's filing procedure for articles of amendment is
the same as that for the original articles of incorporation.33 The re-
quired filing locations under the Kentucky Act are identical with those
of KRS § 271.450. One copy is ified with the Secretary of State, one
with the county clerk in the county where the registered office of the
corporation is located, and a third copy is retained by the corporation.
It should be noted that issuance of the certificate of amendment
by the Secretary of State is required only if he finds that the articles
are in conformity with law.8 4 If the Secretary so finds, he is under an
affirmative duty to file them and issue the certificate of amendment.
A writ of mandamus is the usual remedy to test the propriety of the
Secretary's refusal to file the articles 35
E. Effect of Certificate of Amendment: (KRSA § 271A.815)
KRSA § 271A.315 is identical with KRS § 271.450(2) in providing
that an amendment of the articles is effective when the Secretary of
State issues the certificate of amendment.8 6 Issuance of a certificate
82 MoDEL Bus. Corn,. Acr ANN. 2D § 619 2 (1971).
33 KRSA §§ 271A.275, 271A.310.
34 KRSA § 271A.310(1).
85 See State ex rel. Radio Corp. of America v. Benson, 128 A. 107 (Del. Super.
Ct. 1924).86 KRSA § 271A.315(1).
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of amendment is considered a ministerial act; the certificate serves as
physical evidence that the amendment is now effective and complies
with the law.37
KRSA § 271A.315(2) provides that amendment of the articles
shall not affect any pending cause of action for or against the corpo-
ration or rights of persons other than shareholders.
F. Restated Articles of Incorporation: (KRSA § 271A.820)
When a corporation has made frequent amendments to its articles
of incorporation it may be difficult at a given moment to ascertain
whether the corporation is operating under the original provision or
the amendment.38 To meet this problem of numerous amendments,
unlike the old law, KRSA § 271A.820 provides a method for restating
the articles of incorporation to include in one instrument those portions
of the original articles which remain effective, together with amend-
ments. Shareholder approval"9 is not necessary in order for the
corporation to obtain a restatement of the articles of incorporation;
approval by the board of directors is sufficient 40 since a restatement
makes no substantive change in the articles.41 The restated articles
must contain a declaration that they correctly state the corresponding
provisions of the articles as amended and supersede the original
articles and all amendments to it.42 Thus, the usefulness of the power
to restate articles of incorporation is dependent upon their correctness
and reliability because the Kentucky Act confers upon the restated
articles the finality that is given the original articles.43 If a director
fails to restate accurately, or acts in a fraudulent manner, any person
injured thereby can bring an action in tort against the wrongdoer.44
C. Amendments of Articles of Incorporation in
Re-Organization Proceedings: (KRSA § 271A.825)
KRSA § 271A.325 is designed to coordinate state law with the
federal statutes concerning corporate reorganization.45 In bankruptcy
re-organization proceedings, when a shareholder interest is altered or
eliminated, it is difficult to obtain the required shareholder approval
37 MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. 21 § 63 ff 2 (1971).
3sH. HENN, LAW OF CoRPoRATioNs 708-13.
3 9 Other than acquiring approval for the amendment of the articles as found
in KRSA § 271A.295.
40KRSA § 271A.320(I).4 1 MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. 2D § 64 11 2 (1971).
42KRSA § 271A.320(2).
43 MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. 2D § 64 ff 2 (1971).
44 d.4 MoDEL Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. 2D § 65 U 2 (1971). Kentucky had no similar
provision under its old law.
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for amendment of the articles in order to implement the reorganization
plan.46 As a result, a new corporation might have to be formed to
carry the plan into effect and the advantages that would have been
present had the old corporation remained in existence (e.g., reduction
of taxes and costs) are lost.47 Accordingly, KRSA § 271A.3,5 allows
the articles of the present financially embarrassed corporation to be
amended by such persons as the court shall appoint for that purpose.
The amended articles must make appropriate reference to the court
proceedings, as well as follow the same procedure for filing with the
Secretary of State as in the case of any other amendment under KRSA
§ 271A.S10, "but without any action by the board of directors or
shareholders."48
II. MERGER AMD CONSOLDATION
The terms "consolidation" and "merger" have been used indis-
criminately and interchangeably by courts and text writers regardless
of whether a new corporation is formed or whether a constituent
corporation is preserved. But precision demands that the terms be dis-
tinguished. 49
[A] consolidation is a combination by agreement between two or
more corporations by which their rights, franchises, privileges, and
property are united, and become the rights, franchises, privileges
and property of a single corporation, composed generally, although
not necessarily, of the stockholders of the original corporations.
Strictly speaking, a consolidation signifies such a union as neces-
sarily results in the creation of a new corporation, and the termina-
tion of the existence of the old ones.
[A] merger means the absorption of one corporation by another,
which retains its name and corporate identity with the added
capital, franchises and powers of the merged corporation. It is the
uniting of two or more corporations by the transfer of property to
one of them, which continues in existence, the other being merged
therein.50
A. Right or Power to Consolidate or Merge
Corporations have the right and the power to consolidate or merge
46 It is difficult to acquire shareholder approval because of the fear on the
part of stockholders that they are not going to receive their equitable share of the
bankrupt's assets if a certain plan or course of action is taken.
47 MODEL Bus. CoRP. hOT ANN 2D § 65 II 2 (1971).
48 Id.
49 19 Am. Jua.2d Corporations § 1492 (1965).
50 15 W. FLEtcHm, PFrVATE Con'onxAroNs § 7041 (penn. rev. ed. 1962)
[hereinafter cited as FLETCHE]. For a Kentucky definition see Central Univ. v.
Walters' Ex'rs, 90 S.W. 1066 (Ky. 1906).
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only with the consent and by the authority of the legislature.51 It is
stated that the primary grant of authority to consolidate or merge
is in the act of incorporation or the charter of the company as provided
for by the state's statutes, and that any attempt to consolidate or
merge without such statutory authority is ultra vires and void.52 "The
consent of the state to a valid consolidation or merger must be clearly
and distinctly expressed; it is never implied, and exists only by virtue
of plain legislative enactment."5 3
It is not sufficient that one or more of the consolidating companies
have the essential legislative authority to consolidate; all must have
it.5 4 Furthermore, a contract to consolidate or merge which is beyond
the corporate powers of one corporation is as invalid as if beyond the
corporate powers of both.55
B. Procedure for Merger or Consolidation: (KRSA § 271A.885)
In granting the power to merge or consolidate, the Kentucky Act
in KRSA § 271A.855 and § 271A.860 treats mergers and consolidations
separately to avoid the cumbersome language which exists in many
statutes where provisions governing merger and consolidation are
combined. Although separate, the procedures for merger and con-
solidation are essentially the same, with the initial paragraphs of KRSA
§§ 271A.355 and 271A.860 setting forth the grant of power.56
The procedure in Kentucky now differs from its predecessor which
provided that the board of directors of each corporation that desired
to merge or consolidate must enter into a joint agreement signed by a
majority of the board.57 The agreement was then submitted to the
shareholders of each of the merging or consolidating corporations for
approval5 8 Under the new act the board of directors of each corpo-
ration shall by resolution approve rather than enter into a plan of
merger or consolidation. 9 The new act merely requires that such
terms and conditions as are agreed upon by the respective boards of
51 Ashley v. Ryan, 153 U.S. 436 (1894); Clearwater v. Meredith, 68 U.S. (1
Wall.) 25 (1863); Botts v. Simpsonville & B.C. Turnpike Road Co., 10 S.W. 134
(Ky. 1888).
52 FL-rc=, supra note 50, at § 7048, 33-34.
53 19 Am. JtR.2d Corporations § 1494 (1965). See also Colgate v. United
States Leather Co., 72 A. 126 (N.J. 1909).
54 19 Am. Jum.2d Corporations § 1494 (1965).
55 Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Kentucky, 161 U.S. 677 (1896).
GGKRSA § 271A.355(1); KRSA § 271A.360(1).
5KRS § 271.470(1).
58 KRS § 271.470(2).
59 KRSA § 271A.355(2); KRSA § 271A.360(2).
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directors of the affected corporations be set forth in the plan of the
proposed consolidation or merger.60
Upon approval the articles of merger or consolidation must be
filed with the Secretary of State6 ' and the county court in the county
in which the registered office of the corporation is situated. 2
Subsection 2(c) of both KRSA §§ 271A. 855 and 271A.860 requires
that the plan of merger or consolidation set forth the manner and
basis of converting the shares of each corporation into "shares, obliga-
tions or other securities of the new or surviving corporation or of any
other corporation or, in whole or in part, into cash or other property."
The express reference to cash and to securities of any other corpo-
ration is considered important because it gives added flexibility to
the Kentucky laws. Thus, under the new act it seems that the share-
holders of a merged corporation may be permitted to receive securities
of some third corporation, for example, the parent corporation of the
surviving corporation. This may be desirable since the third company
may be better known to the public and have a broader market.
Alternatively, it is now possible to maintain the separate corporate
identity of the acquired corporation by merging into it a newly created
subsidiary of the acquiring corporation and allowing the subsidiary
to issue to the acquired corporation's shareholders shares of the acquir-
ing corporation or of the parent of the acquiring corporation.6 3
C. Approval by Shareholders: (KRSA § 271A.865)
[I]n view of the fact that the consolidation or merger of one corpo-
ration with another is a fundamental change in the purposes of the
constituent corporations, it is a general principle controlling con-
solidation or merger that such action must receive the assent of
every stockholder in the consolidating bodies, unless the power to
consolidate has been conferred by legislation that may be read
into the contract of incorporation. However, today in most juris-
dictions, the process of consolidation or merger as provided for by
statute rests upon the principle of permitting consolidation or
merger approved by specified percentage of the shareholders,
which in the absence of statute would require the consent of all,
and of permitting dissenters, not wishing to go along, to retire
from the enterprise upon payment to them of the appraised value
of their shares. The purpose of such statutes is to correct the in-
justice to the bulk of the stockholders from want of power in a
6OKRSA § 271A.355(2)(b); KRSA § 271A.860(2)(b).
61KRSA § 271A.370. It has been held that if the plan substantially complies
with the requirements of the statute, mere informalities or omissions will not in-
validate it. Phinizy v. Augusta & K. R.R., 62 F. 678 (Cir. Ct. D. S.C. 1894);
Wells v. Rodgers, 27 N.W. 671 (Mich. 1886).62KRSA § 271A.370(3).63 MODEL Bus. CoRP. AcT. 2D § 71 and § 72 fi 2 (1971).
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corporation to consolidate or merge with another corporation on
terms deemed advantageous by the holders of a large majority of
the stock.64
Under KRSA § 271A.365, consolidation or merger requires only the
affirmative vote of holders of a majority of the shares entitled to vote
thereon.65 This provision recognizes that shareholders who have
waived their right to vote on all other fundamental issues deserve no
inalienable right to vote on a proposed plan of merger or consolida-
tion.66 It should be noted at this point, however, that the articles of
incorporation may, with respect to any shareholder action, require the
vote of approval of a greater proportion of the shares, or any class or
series, than is otherwise required by the act.67
The new law further requires that twenty (20) days' written
notice6 8 must be given to each shareholder of record69 regardless of
whether such shareholder is entitled to vote.70 This requirement differs
from Kentucky's old law which provided that shareholders entitled to
vote had to be given at least ten (10) days' notice unless otherwise
provided in the articles of incorporation or by-laws.7 ' KRSA § 271A.365
also provides that a copy72 of the plan of merger or consolidation must
be enclosed with the notice to the shareholders of record.73
Class voting is allowed if the plan of merger or consolidation con-
tains any provision which, if contained in a proposed amendment to
the articles of incorporation, would entitle such class of shares to vote
as a class.7 4 After such shareholder approval, but at any time prior
to the filing of the articles of merger or consolidation, the merger or
6419 Am. Jutr.2d Corporations § 1498 (1965).
65 KBSA § 271A.365(2).
6 6 MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. 2D § 73 ff 2 (1971).67 KRSA § 271A.655. Regarding construction of a statute specifying the
proportion of vote for stockholder approval, it was held in Market St. Ry. v.
Hellman, 42 P. 255 (Cal. 1895), that where a statute provided that a vote of three-fourths (3,) of the shares was necessary to effect a consolidation, the s atute
referred to shares actually subscribed and outstanding. In Simon Borg & Co. v.
New Orleans City Ry., 234 F. 617 (E.D. La. 1917), the court held that aLouisiana statute requiring a vote of three-fourths (3) of all share-holders" of
each corporation to effect a consolidation was satisfied by three-fourths of the
number of shares and not of the number of holders.68 But see KRSA § 271A.660 which allows a waiver of notice of annual or
special stockholder meetings if a writing signed by the person entitled to such
notice is procured by the corporation.
69KRSA § 271A.365. The various requirements of shareholders voting at a
meeting may be satisfied without a meeting if unanimous written consent is ob-
tained from all shareholders entitled to vote.
70KRSA § 271A.365(1).
71 KRS § 271.295(4).
72 A summary may be substituted if the plan of merger or consolidation is of
excessive length.
73 KRSA § 271A.365(1).
74 KRSA § 271A.365(2).
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consolidation may be abandoned pursuant to any provisions set forth
in the plan of merger or consolidation.7 5
D. Articles of Merger or Consolidation: (KRSA § 271A.870)
KRSA § 271A.870 is principally an implementing section. It is
detailed and complete in itself, indicating what must be contained in
the articles of merger or consolidation. It provides that triplicate
copies of the articles of merger or consolidation, setting forth the
plan and the date and manner of adoption of the plan,76 shall be
delivered to the Secretary of State.77 The certificate of merger or
consolidation, together with two triplicate originals of the articles of
merger or consolidation shall be returned to the new or surviving
corporation.78 One of the triplicate originals shall be recorded with
the clerk of the county court in the county in which the registered
office of the corporation is located.79
In the case of a merger, the articles of incorporation of the sur-
viving corporation might or might not be amended by the merger
plan, depending, of course, upon whether or not they differ from the
original articles of the surviving corporation; in the case of a con-
solidation, the articles of consolidation constitute the articles of
incorporation of the consolidated corporation." The old law did not
make provision for articles of merger; it required only that the "joint
agreement for merger" be filed with the Secretary of State.81 Regarding
the articles of consolidation, the old law simply stated that the man-
datory contents of articles of incorporation for the new corporation,
which was created as the result of the consolidation, must be met.82
E. Merger of Subsidiary Corporations and Rights of
Dissenting Stockholders: (KRSA § 271A.875)
The demand for more corporate flexibility has generated merger
statutes in several states with provisions which are much less stringent
than the common law requirement of unanimous shareholder consent.83
75 KRSA § 271A.365(3).
76 KRSA § 271A.870 (1), (2).
77 KRSA § 271A.370(2).
78 KRSA § 271A.370(3).
79 Id.
8o 1RSA § 271A.380(f).
81 K.S § 271.475.
82 See KRS § 271.475(2) and (3).
83 Comment, The Short Merger Statute, 32 U. Cm. L. Byv. 596 (1965), citing
Geddes v. Anaconda Mining Co., 254 U.S. 590 (1921); Kremer v. Public Drug Co.,
170 N.W. 571 (S.D. 1919).
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An example of such a statute, often called a "Short Merger Statute,"84
is KRSA § 271A.375 of the Kentucky Act. These "short merger statutes"
allow mergers with something less than unanimous shareholder con-
sent.
Under the old law, Kentucky had no provision authorizing the
merger of a parent and its subsidiary without stockholder approval.
Now Kentucky permits the merger of a subsidiary into its parent
corporation without a vote of approval from shareholders of either
corporation if the parent owns at least ninety percent (90%) of the
subsidiary's shares.8 5 It is reasoned that approval by the minority
stockholders is not necesasary because even if they were opposed,
their vote could not prevent the merger proposed by the parent corpo-
ration.8" The rationale underlying this option is that the dissenting
shareholders should not have the ability to block action which the
majority think beneficial.
When a parent corporation and a subsidiary corporation merge
under KRSA § 271A.375, stockholders of the subsidiary are entitled to
dissent 87 and to receive in cash the fair value of their shares.88 How-
ever, the reverse is not true. That is, the shareholders of the parent
corporation are not given voting rights or dissenters' rights; it is
theorized that the merger should not materially affect their rights.8 9
The result is that they have no vote in the matter at all, and their
only remedy would be a suit in equity on the grounds of fraud,
illegality, or abuse of discretion by the directors.90
The dissenting stockholders' rights are the same as those in other
cases of merger, consolidation and sale of assets. In essence, the
84 MODEL Bus. CoP. Aar ANN. 2D § 75 If 2 (1971). The constitutionality of
"short merger" statutes has been upheld by the courts. For example, in Alpren v.
Consol. Edison Co., 65 N.Y.S.2d 254 (Sup. Ct. 1938), the court held that a
statute authorizing a gas and electric company to merge with another corporation
in which it owned 95% of the shares was not unconstitutional as interfering with
the vested rights of shareholders. The court said that such mergers are primarily
a matter of public policy within the control of the legislature, and shareholders
are not entitled to the continued protection of a statute requiring the merging
corporation to own every outstanding share of stock.
85 KRSA § 271A.375(1).8 6 MODEL Bus. CoRuP. Aar AN~r. 2D § 75 Uf 2 (1971).
8?The rights of a dissenting shareholder are only those that are specifically
given him by statute. Troupiansky v. Henry Disston & Sons, Inc., 151 F. Supp.
609 (E.D. Pa. 1957); Beloff v. Consol. Edison Co., 87 N.E.2d 561 (N.Y. 1949).
But see W. CAY, CASES AN MArERIALS ON CoR'oRATONS 1707-12 (4th ed.
1969) for common law exceptions.
88 KlSA §§ 271A.400; 271A.405.
8 D MODEL Bus. CoP. ACr ANN. 2D § 75 Uf 2 (1971).
90Johnson v. Baldwin, 69 S.E.2d 585 (S.C. 1952); Outwater v. Public Serv.




minority's right to dissent is the right to withdraw from the corpo-
ration by requiring the enterprise to purchase the dissenter's shares
for their fair value.91 This means that after majority ratification the
minority stockholder has the opportunity to accept whatever plan of
merger the majority approves. However, if he elects not to continue,
he must make an objection in writing, as well as a demand far pay-
ment,9 2 in order to force the corporation to purchase his shares at a
value fixed by appraisal.9 3
It should be noted that:
[s]tatutory provisions which define the manner in which a dis-
senting stockholder must make known his dissent from the pro-
posed corporate action, and make demand for the appraisal of his
stock or the payment of the value to him, and particularly those
which define the time within which his objections must be filed
and suit brought, are generally construed to be mandatory, and not
merely directory requirements which must be complied with, or
the stockholder will lose his right to insist upon payment of the
value of his stock.94
Thus, the stockholder who objects to a fundamental corporate change
(e.g., merger, consolidation, sale of assets, etc.) and who seeks to be
paid for the value of his stock and to withdraw from the corporate
enterprise must object in writing to the proposed action. The basic
purpose of this requirement is to inform the corporation and its other
stockholders of the number of possible demandants of cash for their
shares. 05
A problem is often raised in dissenting shareholder cases as to what
is the "fair value" of the dissenter's stock. The term "fair value" as
used in statutes permitting dissenting stockholders to obtain the fair
value of their stock from the corporation is said to mean the intrinsic
worth of the stock which is to be arrived at after an appraisal of all
the elements of value.96 The court, in deciding whether the dissenter
91 Amsler, Organic Changes in the Corporation: Amendment, Merger and Con-
solidation, Sale of Assets, 4 BAYLOR L. REv. 449, 454 (1952).
92 KRSA § 271A.405(1).
93 KRSA § 271A.405.
94 19 Am. Jum.2d Corporations § 516 (1965).
95 19 Am. JuR.2d Corporations § 516 (1965). It has been said that a require-
ment that a shareholder dissent in writing before he is entitled to sell his stock to
the corporation may be fulfilled by his writing through an agent. Furthermore,
the agent is not required to exhibit proof of his authority unless requested
by the corporation to do so. Zeeb v. Atlas Powder Co., 87 A.2d 123 (Del. 1952).96 Lucas v. Pembroke Water Co., 135 S.E.2d 147 (Va. 1964). A statement of
a rule that uniformly sets out factors to consider in arriving at "fair value" is
impracticable because every appraisal is a particular problem, varying with the
type of corporation, the nature, extent, and methods of its operations, and the
form of its liabilities and assets. American Gen. Corp. v. Camp, 190 A. 225 (Md.
1928).
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is receiving a "fair value" for his stock, must use an equitable standard
to assure that the value received is not grossly inadequate.9 7
There are several general approaches currently being used to value
the dissenting shareholders' stock, the most common being the market-
value, asset value, and book value methods.98 The market value ap-
proach is probably the most widely used; however, this method's use-
fulness in evaluating the dissenter's stock will depend upon the size
of the corporation involved as well as the total factual situation.
Market value appears to be most persuasive if the stock is listed on
the exchanges and/or is actively traded, but of minimal weight where
the corporation is a close corporation.99
None of these methods of valuation is exclusive of the others. All
assets, tangible and intangible, including goodwill, should be included
in arriving at "fair value." Further, the courts tend to consider the
management and reputation of the company, nature of the business,
earnings (past, present and future), dividend record and age of the
company.100 The Kentucky Act states that the "fair value" is to be
determined as of the day prior to the date on which the vote was
taken approving the proposed corporation action, excluding any
appreciation or depreciation in anticipation of such corporate action.1 1
Regarding the procedural aspects of the "short merger," the new
act requires that a copy of the plan of merger be mailed to each
shareholder of record of the subsidiary corporation.10 2 On or subse-
quent to the thirtieth day following the mailing of a copy of the plan
of merger to shareholders of the subsidiary corporation, triplicate
originals of the articles of merger shall be delivered to the Secretary
of State who will then issue a Certificate of Merger.1 3 One copy of
the articles of merger must be filed with and recorded by the clerk
97 19 AM. Jur.2d Corporations § 1543 (1965).
98 "Market value" is said to be the price stock would command in the market.
It is the price at which the stock would sell if offered by a vendor who is willing
to sell and a purchaser who desires to buy but is not compelled to take the stock.
The "asset theory" values the stock on the basis of the worth of corporate assets.
In the application of this theory it is held that intangible as well as physical assets
are to be taken into account, and that the shareholder is entitled to the "real"
whole value and not merely the liquidating value. The "book value" method ar-
rives at the purchase price by using the net value of the business assets (i.e., de-
ducting liabilities from assets of the corporation). This particular method of
valuation is often criticized by accountants as being unrealistic. See 19 Am. JuR.2d
Corporations § 158 (1965); A. GuILD, STOcK-PuRcHAsE Ac AND THE
CLosE CoRPoRATioN 29 (1960); Annot., 38 A.L.R.2d 442 (1954).
99 See 19 Am. Jua.2d Corporations § 518 (1965).
100 19 Am. JuR.2d Corporations § 520 (1965).
101 KRSA § 271A.405(2).
102 KRSA § 271A.375(2).
103 KRSA § 271A.375(4).
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of the county court in the county where the registered office is
situated. 0 4
The "short merger" statutes have failed to silence the critics who
insist that the burden of immediate taxation on the dissenter as a result
of being paid fair value makes the provision undesirable. Thus, the
minority stockholder who wishes to participate in the new corporation
could be forced to settle for securities valued at less than the fair
value of his interest. The minority could be intimidated by the fact
that any truly fair offer would be paid only in cash-an offer in com-
pliance with the statute but potentially worth less to them due to the
burden of immediate taxation.10 5
F. Effect of Merger or Consolidation of Domestic
and Foreign Corporation: (KRSA § 271A.880)
KRSA § 271A.880 is similar to old KRS §§ 271.480 and 271.485 in
providing that the filing of the articles of merger constitutes an amend-
ment to the articles of incorporation of the surviving corporation
while the filing of the articles of consolidation serves as the articles
of incorporation of the corporation created by the consolidation. 06
Therefore, in case of merger, all that need be filed is the articles of
merger which will include the terms of the merger, and in event of
consolidation, articles of consolidation containing the terms of the
consolidation. In the case of a merger the need for filing amendments
to the articles of incorporation is eliminated while in the case of a
consolidation no articles of incorporation need to be filed for the
resulting company. 0 7 It should be noted that this provision under
the new act avoids the corporate procedural problem of requiring a
separate vote of shareholders to amend a corporate charter in con-
nection with a merger. 08
KIRSA § 271A.880(1) provides that, upon the issuance of the
certificate of merger or certificate of consolidation by the Secretary of
State, the merger or consolidation shall be effective, and the new or
surviving corporation shall be vested with all the rights, privileges,
immunities and powers of the old corporations, 0 9 and subject to all
their liabilities" and duties."' In addition, the separate existence of
104 KRSA § 271A.375(5).
105 Comment, The Short Merger Statute, 32 U. Cm. L. REv. 596, 598, 600
(1965).
106 KBSA § 271A.380(f).
10 7 LEoistrLvr HEAUN, supra note 11, at 142.
108 MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. 2D § 76 1 2 (1971).
109 Covington Gaslight Co. v. City of Covington, 58 S.W. 805, 808 (Ky. 1900).
11Opayne-Baber Coal Co. v. Butler, 123 S.W.2d 273 (Ky. 1939); Kentucky
Beaver Collieries v. Mellon & Smith, 254 S.W. 421 (Ky. 1923); Carter Coal Co. v.
Clouse, 173 S.W. 794 (Ky. 1915).
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all corporations which are a party to the merger or consolidation
terminates, except for the surviving or new corporation." 2 Since the
surviving or new corporation is subject to all liabilities and duties and
acquires all rights and powers of the old companies, the effect on
the relationship of third parties to the former corporations is normally
left unchanged. However, there are situations where the personal
element of the relationship will prevent a merged or consolidated
corporation from stepping into the shoes of the corporation which it
succeeds." 3 For example, Globe & R.F. Insurance Co. v. Jones" 4
held that an insurance agent was not bound by his contract with an
insurance company after the company had merged. The court found
that insurance companies vary in procedure and reputation, and that
while an agent may be willing to represent one company, he cannot
be required to serve in that capacity for another simply because his
former employer was merged into the new company. However, in
the Kentucky case of Chipman v. Turner, Day & Woolworth Manu-
facturing Co.," 5 it was held that an employer cannot usually avoid a
contract with an employee because of a consolidation or merger.
G. Merger or Consolidation of Domestic and
Foreign Corporations: (KRSA § 271A.885)
Kentucky's corporate statute was amended in 1970116 to allow a
merger or consolidation between a domestic and foreign corporation
resulting in a foreign corporation. 7 The old law provided that if the
surviving corporation was to be a foreign corporation, it must file with
the Secretary of State a consent to service of process and irrevocably
appoint the Secretary of State as agent to accept service," 8 and also
file an agreement to pay promptly any amount to which dissenting
shareholders of the domestic corporation may be entitled" 9 as well as
an agreement providing that the courts of Kentucky shall retain juris-
diction over all corporate property within this state as if the combina-
tion had not taken place. These provisions are carried forward in the
"' KRSA § 271A.380(c), (d) and (e). In Union Canal Co. v. Young,
1 Whart. 410 (Pa. 1914), the court stated that there is no suspension of corporate
rights in the case of a consolidation-the whole estate and interest of the con-
stituent corporations vest immediately in the consolidated corporation.
112 KRSA § 271A.380(2)(b).
11 Comment, Fundamental Corporate Changes-Merger, Consolidation, Sale
of Assets and Dissolution, 28 TENN. L. REv. 529, 541 (1961).
"14 89 N.W. 580 (Mich. 1902).
"15 106 S.W. 852, 853 (Ky. 1908).
"16 ENAc'r. Acrs 1946, ch. 141, § 1; 1970, ch. 263, § 5; ENACT. AcTs 1970, chi.
263 § 6.
137 KRS H§ 271.465; 271.468.
118 KRS §§ 271.465; 271.468(3) (b).
19 KRS § 271.468(3) (c).
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new act.'20 Thus, KRSA § 271A.385 appears to be an attempt to meet
the spirit of § 200 of the Kentucky Constitution' 2' by providing that
Kentucky retain jurisdiction (which the constitutional provision sought
to do), while at the same time trying to prevent impairment of the
corporate climate.
III. ASSET SALEs AND DissoLUTroN
A. Sale or Disposition of Assets: (KRSA § 271A.890)
A sale of property by one corporation to another is distinguishable
from a merger or consolidation. "A merger . . . involve[s] a sale of
assets, in the sense that the title to the assets is by operation of law
transferred from the constituent corporation to the surviving corpo-
ration, but it is not the same as a liquidation of the enterprise by sale"
because "[a] merger ordinarily contemplates the continuance of the
enterprise and of the stockholder's investment therein." 22
KRSA § 217A.020(5) provides that a corporation shall have power
to sell, convey, lease, exchange, transfer or otherwise dispose of all
or any part of its property and assets. At common law, such power of
sale, lease, exchange, or other disposition by a solvent corporation of
all or substantially all of its assets usually required unanimous share-
holder approval.' 2 3 Most states today, however, have by statute re-
duced the required percentage of shareholder approval required for
such transactions.
24
The general rule is that the power of a corporation to alienate its
property includes the power to alienate its entire property. 25 And
it has been held that if the statute is in force at the time the corpo-
ration is formed or the contract of subscription entered into, the dis-
senting shareholder is precluded from objecting if the sale is in good
faith,126 even if the corporation is a going concern. 127
120 KRSA § 271A.385(1)(b)(1), (2) and (3).
121 Section 200 reads:
If any ... corporation, organized under the laws of this Commonwealth,
shall consolidate by sale or otherwise, with any . . . other corporation
organized under the laws of any other state, the same shall not thereby
become a foreign corporation, but the courts of the Commonwealth shall
retain jurisdiction over that part of the corporate property within the
limits of this State in all matters which may arise, as if said consolidation
had not taken place.
122 Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 93 A.2d 107, 112 (Del. 1952).
123 Geddes v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 254 U.S. 590 (1921); Carpenters
Local Union No. 1266 v. Texas State Fedn of Labor Bldg. Ass'n, 288 S.W.2d 874(Tex. 1956).
124 H. HENN, LA-W o" CoRPoRTInoNs 699.
125 White Water Valley Canal Co. v. Vallette, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 414 (1858).
126 19 Am. JuR.2d Corporations § 1530 (1965) at 908, citing Klein v. Jefferson
(Continued on next page)
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The old Kentucky law did not appear to distinguish sales, leases,
and exchanges incurred in the ordinary course of business from those
not in the ordinary course of business, but rather looked at solvency
of the corporation.128 Under the old law, if the corporation, domestic
or foreign, could meet its liabilities when they matured (i.e., if it were
solvent) it could sell, lease, exchange or encumber its assets in whole
or part upon a favorable vote of the majority'29 of the shareholders
entitled to vote at a meeting called for that purpose. However, if
the corporation was unable to meet its liabilities when matured (i.e.,
if it were insolvent), the authorization could be given by approval of
the board of directors with no shareholder vote required. 30
The new corporation statute differentiates a sale, lease, exchange
or other disposition of all or substantially all the property and assets
of a corporation in the usual and regular course of business' 3 ' from
one not in the usual and regular course of business. 132 In the latter,
the board of directors adopts a resolution recommending the sale
and submits a resolution at a shareholder meeting (either annual or
special) for approval. 133 Each shareholder of record, whether or not
entitled to vote, must be given not less than twenty (20) days' written
notice of the meeting, whether annual or special; the notice must
mention the proposed transaction as one of the purposes of the meet-
ing.134 KRSA § 271A.395 requires the affirmative vote of the holders
of a majority of the shares of the corporation entitled to vote thereon
and further provides that if any group of shares is entitled to vote as
a class, the authorization shall require the affirmative vote of the
holders of a majority of the shares of each group of shares entitled to
vote as a class and also of the total shares entitled to vote. 35
In the case of sale of assets in the regular course of business, KRSA
§ 271A.390 gives the board authority to act alone and no action by
(Footnote continued ,from preceding page)
Co. Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 195 So. 593 (Ala. 1940).
127 May v. Midwest Ref. Co., 121 F.2d 431 (Ist Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 314
U.S. 668 (1941).
128 See KRS § 271.415.
129 The vote required could be changed by amendment, but could not be less
than majority. KRS § 271.415(2).
180 KRS § 271.415(2).
'13 KRSA § 271A.390.
132 KRSA § 271A.395. "Whether or not a sale, lease, exchange, or other dis-
position is in the regular course of business should be tested by the purpose
clauses of the articles of incorporation or by the business in which the corpora-
tion is actually engaged is an unresolved question in most jurisdictions." H. HENN,
LAw OF CohuoaAnoNs 700.
1a3 KRSA § 271A.395(2).
134 Id.




the corporation's shareholders is required.13 6 As a safety precaution, 1 37
KRSA § 271A.895 permits the board of directors, without further
action or approval by shareholders, in its discretion, to abandon any
sale, lease, exchange, or other disposition of assets after authorization
by the stockholders. This, however, is subject to the contractual rights
of third parties.138 In addition, as is true in other cases of fundamental
changes, stockholders objecting to the sale of assets have a right to
require appraisal and purchase of their stock by the corporation if
the necessary procedural steps are followed.1 39
The broad powers granted by KRSA § 271A.390 and § 271A.895
appear to have been diluted somewhat by the Kentucky case Kaye v.
Kentucky Public Elevator Co., which holds that where the majority
of the stockholders of a corporation are authorized by statute to sell
the corporation's property, despite the opposition of the minority stock-
holders, they cannot exercise their powers in such a way as to buy
the property for themselves and exclude the minority from a fair
participation in the fruits of the sale.140 Thus, a sale of corporate
assets by a majority stockholder to himself for less than he could obtain
from another is voidable at the instance of a minority stockholder. 41
A purchase by a majority stockholder or an officer of the corporation
is regarded in the same light as a purchase by a trustee of the property
of a trust. Such a purchase is not void; rather it is voidable at the
election of the beneficiaries. A court of equity will scrutinize these
transactions and will set them aside upon a slight showing of bad
faith.142
B. Camouflaged Sales-De Facto Mergers
In a sale, lease, or exchange of assets situation, the new act confers
dissenter's rights upon the shareholders of the selling corporation but
not upon the shareholders of the purchasing corporation.1 43 In other
Model Act jurisdictions corporations have attempted to circumvent
the statute by purchasing the assets of a second corporation under a
complicated plan in which the business of the purchasing corporation
136 KRSA § 271A.390.
137 MODEL Bus. CoP. AcT ANN. 2D § 77 and § 78 U 2 (1971).
138 KRSA § 271A.395(4).
'39 See KRSA H§ 271A.400; 271A.405.
140 175 S.W.2d 142 (Ky. 1943).
141 Wheeler v. Abilene Nat'l Bank Bldg. Co., 159 F. 391 (8th Cir. 1908);
Abelow v. Midstates Oil Corp., 189 A.2d 675 (Del. 1963).
142 May v. Midwest Ref. Co., 121 F.2d 431 (1st Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 314
U.S. 668 (1941).
14 KRSA § 271A.400 (1) (b).
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is substantially changed, with the end effect the same as that of a
merger.14 4 In such situations, the courts have applied the doctrine
of de facto merger which theorizes that what in form is a sale of assets
is in reality a merger, and thus subject to appraisal rights of dissenting
stockholders.
The leading cases concerning de facto mergers are Farris v. Glen
Corp.;'45 Heilbrunn v. Sun Chemical Corp.;46 and Applestein v. United
Board & Carton Corp.147 In Farris, a sale of assets case, Glen Alden
Corporation agreed to purchase the assets of List. List was a holding
company for subsidiaries which were engaged in a variety of busi-
nesses, none of which were similar to Glen Alden's activities.148 The
assets of the companies were nearly equal, although after the sale
the purchasing corporation would be transformed from a coal mining
company into a diversified holding company. Further, the purchasing
corporation would end up with assets of $169,000,000, double the
amount of its prior assets, and long-term debt of $38,000,000, seven
times its prior debt. After the consummation of the sale, the directors
of the selling corporation would have control; 75% of the stock would
be owned by the shareholders of the selling corporation; and the book
value of the stock would decrease from $38 to $21 per share.
The Farris court believed that the policy of the appraisal statutes
should be applicable:
[W]hen a corporation combines with another so as to lose its
essential nature and alter the original fundamental relationships of
the shareholders among themselves and to the corporation, a share-
holder who does not wish to continue his membership therein
may treat his membership in the original corporation as terminated
and have the value of his shares paid to him.149
The court held that: (1) the transaction was in substance a de facto
merger and (2) even if it were not, Glen Alden (nominal purchaser)
was the "real" seller. Therefore, the court concluded that this trans-
action was an "upside-down sale" (i.e., a situation where the selling
corporation is in effect acquiring the purchasing corporation's assets)
144 H. HENN, LAw OF CORP'OPTIONS 725.
145 143 A.2d 25 (Pa. 1958).
146 150 A.2d 755 (Del. 1959).
147 159 A.2d 146 (N.J. 1960).
148 Glen Alden (the nominal purchaser) mined coal and manufactured fire-
fighting equipment and air-conditioning units. List (the nominal seller) was a
holding company with diverse interests in movie theatres, real estate and textile
companies, etc.
149 143 A.2d 25, 29 (Pa. 1958).
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and Glen Alden's shareholders were entitled to an appraisal right
under the sale of assets statute.150
In Heilbrunn,'5' also involving a sale of assets, plaintiffs (share-
holders in the purchasing corporation) asserted that they were entitled
to appraisal rights based upon the de facto merger theory. Here the
court held that even though a de facto merger existed, the shareholders
were not entitled to appraisal rights because they bad not been injured.
They were not forced to accept stock of another corporation; the
essential nature of the business of the purchasing corporation had not
been altered; and the facts were not sufficient to establish an "upside-
down sale" situation.152
In Applestein,153 the court was presented with a sale of stock
situation in which stockholders of the purchasing corporation were
asserting a de facto merger which would entitle them to appraisal
rights. The court, basing its decision upon facts similar to those in
Farris v. Glen Alden Corp., found that in reality the purchasing corpo-
ration was the selling corporation (i.e., an upside-down sale) and, there-
fore, all shareholders were entitled to appraisal rights.15 4
Under the Kentucky Act, the de facto doctrine should not be of
great importance because shareholders are given the right to dissent
in connection with all major fundamental corporate changes (i.e.,
merger, consolidation and sale of assets). Possibly the most important
application of the doctrine in Kentucky will be in the "upside-down
sale" situations previously discussed. Another area in which the doc-
trine may be utilized is the tender-offer. Through use of the tender-
offer an outside corporation may bypass the management of the
corporation in a bid for control, and proceed directly to the share-
holders, offering them an attractive price for their stock. If the tender-
offer is successful, the end result may be identical to that of a merger;
15o The application of the de facto merger doctrine in Farris was based upon
a variety of factors, namely:
[A] complete change in the nature of the corporation's business, the
doubling of the size of the successor corporation, a shift in control of
the board of directors to the selling corporation, the purchasers as-
sumption of the seller's liabilities, a reduction of the proportionate in-
terest of the purchasing corporation's shareholders in the successor
corporation plus a sharp drop in the book value of their shares, and
the fact that the selling corporation dissolved and distributed the shares
it received to its shareholders.
Folk, De Facto Mergers in Delaware: Hariton v. Arco Electronics, Inc., 49 VA. L.
REv. 1261, 1266 (1963).
151 150 A.2d 755 (Del. 1959).
152 Symposium of South Carolina Corporation Law, 15 S. CARl. L. REv. 275,
434 (1963).
153 159 A.2d 146 (N.J. 1960).
15' 15 S. CAR. L. REv. 275, supra note 152, at 434.
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the management of the outside company would be in control of the
corporation because of their majority interest in the stock. The dis-
senting stockholders, should they desire to withdraw from the corpo-
ration, might invoke the de facto merger theory and attempt to obtain
appraisal rights for their shares. 55
C. Mortgaging of Property and Making of Guaranty
A mortgage is merely a form of alienation of property, and under
its property alienation power a corporation may mortgage its property
to borrow money.156 The power of a corporation to incur indebtedness
in the legitimate transaction of its business consistent with the purpose
of its organization is necessarily implied. 57 A private corporation
organized for pecuniary profit, unless forbidden by statute or its
charter, may borrow money whenever the necessity of business so
demands and may issue securities or customary evidences of debt,
such as notes, bonds or mortgages. It has been held that such power
is incidental to powers necessary for carrying out the purposes of
incorporationisg A corporation cannot escape liability for money
borrowed on the theory that the money borrowed was used by it to
carry forward a business or transaction it was not authorized to
prosecute.', 9 Also, the lender's knowledge of the corporation's unau-
thorized purpose for the borrowed money does not affect the liability
of the corporation to repay.'60
These common law principles are expressly set forth in KRSA §
271A.020 and § 271A.390. KRSA § 271A.020 empowers a corporation
to make a guaranty, to incur liabilities, to borrow money, and to secure
its obligations by mortgage or pledge of its property. KRSA § 271A.890
provides that the directors, without shareholder approval, may mort-
gage or pledge any or all assets of the corporation whether or not in
the usual or regular course of business.16 The old law provided that
no shareholder approval was required for mortgage; 6 2 however, no
mention was made of shareholder approval concerning pledge of
corporate assets or guaranty of third party obligations. Finally, stock-
155 For a thorough discussion of mergers, consolidations, sales of assets and of
stock and corporate acquisitions see W. CAnY, CAsEs AND MATERIALS ON CoRPO ,-
TIONS 1622 (4th ed. 1969).
156 Phillips v. Winslow, 57 Ky. (18 B. Mon.) 431 (1857).
157 Fidelity Trust Co. v. Louisville Gas Co., 81 S.W. 927 (Ky. 1904).
158 Provident Store's Receiver v. Tanner, 10 S.W.2d 1077 (Ky. 1928).
159 Wright v. Hughes, 21 N.E. 907 (Ind. 1889); North Hudson Mut. Bldg. &
Loan Assn v. First Natl Bank, 47 N.W. 300 (Wis. 1890).
160 Wright v. Hughes, 21 N.E. 907 (Ind. 1889).
161 KRSA § 271A.390.
162 KRS § 271.415(5).
1972]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
holders objecting to the corporate mortgage, pledge or guaranty have
no appraisal remedy under the new act.1 63
IV. CoPROTE, DISSOLUTION ANI) LIQUIDATION
Corporate existence begins with the issuance of a formal certificate
of incorporation and, absent a provision for non-perpetual duration,
continues until dissolution or annulment of the charter. Dissolution has
been defined by one knowledgeable authority as follows:
The term "dissolution," as applied to a corporation, signifies the
extinguishment... of its corporate existence. It has been described
as that condition of law and fact which ends the capacity of the
body corporate to act as such and necessitates a liquidation and
extinguishment of all legal relations existing in respect of the corpo-
rate enterprise. It denotes the complete destruction of the corpo-
ration, and, within contemplation of law, is equivalent to its death,
being sometimes likened to the death of a natural person.164
At common law, a corporation could not be dissolved by the
unilateral act of the corporation or its shareholders;165 since the
corporation was deemed a creature of the state which chartered it,
its existence could not be terminated except by some act of the
sovereign power by which it was created. 66 Consent of the sovereign
is still required although it is now given in advance by statute. 67
The Kentucky Act includes several methods for dissolution of a
corporation other than by the expiration of the corporate existence as
provided for in the charter. These methods will be discussed sub-
sequently with an attempt to distinguish prior Kentucky law and the
new Kentucky Act and to illustrate the possible ramifications of the
new law upon the process of corporate dissolution. Regardless of
which method of dissolution is involved (voluntary or involuntary),
under the new act there are three stages: statement of intent to dis-
solve, winding up or liquidation, and dissolution or termination. 6 8
A. Voluntary Dissolution by Incorporators: (KRSA § 271A.410)
KRSA § 271A.410 is very similar to Kentucky's prior law, 6 except
that it does not establish a time limit' 70 within which the incorporators
163 H. HENN, LAWv OF CORPORATIONs 706.
164 16 W. FLETCHE, supra note 50, § 7966, at 8-9.
165 19 Am. Jua.2d Corporations § 1587 (1965).
166 Id.
167 MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. 2D § 82 ff 2 (1971).
168 H. HENN, LAW OF CORPoRATioNS 721.
169 KRS § 271.495.
170 The time limit was one (1) year from the date of issuance of the articles
of incorporation under the old law (KRS § 271.495).
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must act in order to voluntarily dissolve the corporation. A dual
requirement must be met before this section can be utilized. If the
corporation has not issued any shares of stock the corporation may be
dissolved by its incorporators171 provided a majority of the incorpo-
rators elect that the corporation be so dissolved.172 This section is
expected to have particular application where the conditions which
stimulated creation of the corporation have not materialized, or have
abated, and it is believed by the incorporators that the corporation
would be a financial failure.1'73
B. Voluntary Dissolution by Consent of Shareholders or
by Act of Corporation: (KRSA §§ 271A.45; 271A.420)
Under the new act, voluntary dissolution by consent of the share-
holders requires written unanimous consent of the shareholders of the
corporation. 74 Dissolution by act of the corporation involves the
adoption of a resolution by the board of directors recommending such
action. Written notice is thereafter given to each shareholder of
record entitled to vote, 75 and the question is then submitted at either
an annual or special meeting for shareholder vote.176 The resolution
to dissolve must receive the affirmative vote of the holders of a
majority 177 of the shares entitled to vote thereon, unless any group of
shares is entitled to vote as a class, in which event both the affirmative
vote of the shares entitled to vote thereon as a class and of the total
shares entitled to vote must be received.178
These two sections closely parallel the provisions of the old law.179
The basic distinction is that the old law provided that the affirmative
vote of the holders of a majority of the voting power of all shareholders
entitled to vote was necessary for both dissolution by consent of share-
holders and by act of the corporation whereas the new law requires,
in the case of dissolution by consent of shareholders, unanimous writ-
ten consent of shareholders, regardless of whether or not they have
voting power.180 Requiring unanimous written consent in order to
dissolve by consent of the stockholders appears favorable to the small
.71 KRSA § 271A.410(1).
172 KRSA § 271A.410 (1) (a) (7).
173 MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. 2D § 82 IT 2 (1971).
174 KRSA § 271A.415.
175 KRSA § 271A.420(2).
170 KRSA § 271A.420(1).
177 This vote requirement can be changed by the articles of incorporation, but
it cannot be less than a majority (KRSA § 271A.160).
178 KRSA § 271A.420 (3).
179 KRS § 271.500.
180 KRSA § 271A.415.
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closely held corporation but may be burdensome or even prohibitive
to the large public corporation.
C. Filing of Statement of Intent to Dissolve; Effect of Statement of
Intent to Dissolve; and Procedure After Filing of Statement of Intent
to Dissolve: (KRSA §§ 271A.425-271A.435)
At common law, upon dissolution, the corporation's realty reverted
to the original grantor or his heirs; personalty escheated to the state;
all debts to and from the corporation were extinguished; and the
corporation could neither sue nor be sued.' 8 ' Today, statutory pro-
visions prescribe the effects of dissolution and the procedures to be
followed. Kentucky's old law1 82 is similar to the new act with the
most notable difference found in subsection (3) of KRSA § 271A.435.
KRSA § 271A.435(3) describes a mechanism for liquidation under
supervision of the circuit court in the county where the registered
office or principal place of business of the corporation is located. This
provision assures the orderly liquidation of the corporation's business
and affairs because the corporation is protected from suits by creditors
or dissatisfied shareholders. 8 3
When dissolution has been authorized under KRSA §§ 271A.415
or 271A.420, a statement of intent must be filed in quadruplicate with
the Secretary of State. 8 4 This statement constitutes public notice to
both the state and individuals that dissolution proceedings have
officially begun.'8 5 After filing, the business of the corporation ceases
except as necessary to wind up the affairs of the corporation, but
corporation existence continues until a certificate of dissolution has
been issued by the Secretary of State or a decree dissolving the
corporation has been entered by a court of competent jurisdiction' 88
During this period of winding up, notice is mailed to each known
creditor, 1 7 assets are collected, liabilities and obligations discharged,
and the remaining assets distributed to the corporation's share-
holders. 8 8 The directors and officers of a corporation in the process
of being dissolved have been held personally liable for debts con-
tracted by the corporation during the winding up period and for the
value of assets distributed to shareholders to the extent that no pro-
1811 W. BLACKSTONE, COMEIENTARIES *484, cited in H. HENN, LAw or
CORPORATIONS 719.
182 KRS §§ 271.505, 271.510, and 271.515.
183 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. 2D §§ 88-91 U 2 (1971).
184 KRSA § 271A.425(1), (4).
185 MODEL Bus. CortP. ACT ANN. 2D §§ 85-87 f1 2 (1971).
186 KRSA § 271A.430.
187 KRSA § 271A.435(1).
188 KRSA § 271A.435(2).
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vision has been made for payment of the corporate debts 8 9 because
deemed in violation of their duties as trustees to liquidate the
corporation. 190
Some of the legal effects of dissolution are not specified by the
new Act. Therefore, prior Kentucky law may be applicable especially
since the prior law and the present law in this area are similar. Cases
decided under the old law held that the right to property owned by a
corporation at dissolution vests in the shareholders, subject to any
corporate liabilities;' 91 that is, title to a defunct corporation's property,
remaining after satisfaction of debts, passes to the stockholders as
owners in common or partners. 192 In Scuddy Mining Co. v. Mullins,193
where a corporation, prior to dissolution, contracted to pay an injured
employee $15 per week for 90 weeks as compensation for injuries and
made immediate payments at the specified rate for a period of time,
it was held that upon dissolution the injured employee was entitled
to share in the distribution of the assets as a general creditor.
D. Revocation of Voluntary Dissolution Proceedings by Consent of
Shareholders or by Act of Corporation; Filing of Statement of Revoca-
tion of Voluntary Proceedings; Effect of Statement of Revocation of
Voluntary Dissolution Proceedings: (KRSA §§ 271A.440-271A.455)
In the absence of statutory provision there is no power by which
dissolution proceedings may be discontinued after the filing of a
statement of intent to dissolve with the Secretary of State.194 The new
statute provides such authority via KRSA §§ 271A.440-271A.455.
Kentucky's old law' 95 differs only slightly from the new act regarding
revocation of voluntary dissolution proceedings by consent of the
shareholders or by act of the corporation-the significant difference
being in the provision for revocation of proceedings by consent of
the shareholders. 190 KRSA § 271A.440 requires written consent of
of all shareholders, regardless of whether or not they are entitled to
vote whereas prior law required written consent of the holders of
a majority of the voting power of all shareholders entitled to vote.
In the case of revocation of dissolution proceedings by act of the
corporation, the board of directors is required to adopt a resolution
189 KRSA § 271A.240 (1) (c).
190 Borbein, Young & Co. v. Cirese, 401 S.W.2d 940 (Mo. 1966).
'91 Shadoin v. Sellars, 4 S.W.2d 717 (Ky. 1928).
192 Barrowman Coal Corp. v. Kentland Coal & Coke Co., 196 S.W.2d 428
(Ky. 1946).193 262 S.W.2d 192 (Ky. 1953).
194 MODEL Bus. CORP. Aar ANN. 2D §§ 88-91 1 2 (1971).
105 KRS §§ 271.520-271.530.
196 KRSA § 271A.440.
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recommending such action prior to the issuance of a certificate of
dissolution by the Secretary of State.197 Written notice thereof is
given to each shereholder of record entitled to vote' 98 and the issue
is then submitted for a vote at a special meetings of the shareholder.199
In order to be adopted the corporate resolution to revoke the dis-
solution proceedings must receive the affirmative vote of the holders
of a majority of the shares entitled to vote thereon.200
Upon the adoption of such resolution, a statement of revocation
of voluntary dissolution201 is executed in quadruplicate by the corpo-
ration and delivered to the Secretary of State.2 02 If the Secretary finds
that the statement conforms to law, 20 3 he files one of the original copies
in his office,204 forwards one to the Commissioner of Revenue, 205 and
returns the other two to the corporation.200 The corporation must fie
one of these with the clerk of the county court in fhe county in which
the registered office of the corporation is situated and retain one for
its corporate records.207 When the Secretary of State files the statement
of revocation of voluntary dissolution proceedings, the revocation be-
comes effective and the corporation may once again carry on its
business.208
These sections offer flexibility in those cases where conditions and
circumstances have changed substantially for what they were when
the vote favoring voluntary dissolution was agreed upon and con-
tinuation of the corporate existence has once again become desirable.
The new procedure should prove more simple and less costly than
winding up the business and then creating a new corporation.209
E. Articles of Dissolution and Their Filing: (KRSA
§§ 271A.460 and 271A.465)
KRSA §§ 271A.460 and 271A.465 of the new act are identical with
corresponding provisions of the old law.210 Thus, if voluntary dissolu-
tion proceedings have not been revoked,21' KRSA § 271A.460 allows
the corporation to be dissolved when articles of dissolution are
197 KRSA § 271A.445.
198 KRSA § 271A.445(2).
199 KRSA § 271A.445(1).
200 KRSA § 271A.445(3).
201 By consent of the shareholders or by act of the corporation.
202 KRSA § 271A.445(4). The statement of voluntary dissolution must itself
be adopted either by consent of the shareholders or by act of the corporation.
203 KRSA § 271A.450.
204 KRSA § 271A.450 (1).
205 KRSA § 271A.450 (3).2 06 KRSA § 271A.450(4).
207 Id.2 08 KRSA § 271A.455.
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executed and verified in triplicate by officers of the corporation
who state that all debts, liabilities and obligations have been paid
and discharged, or adequate provision made therefore; 212 all of the
remaining property and assets have been distributed to the corporate
shareholders; 213 and adequate provision has been made for the satis-
faction of any judgment, order or decree which may be entered
against it in any pending suit.214 KRSA § 271A.465 then requires
the articles of dissolution to be filed with the Secretary of State. If
the Secretary finds the articles conform to law,2 15 he files one copy in
his office216 and issues a certificate of dissolution,217 together with the
two other originals of the articles of dissolution, to the dissolved
corporation.218 One of these originals of the articles of dissolution
must be filed with and recorded by the clerk of the county court in
the county in which the registered office of the corporation is located.219
The corporate existence ceases upon issuance of a certificate of dis-
solution except as provided in KRSA § 271A.515. 220
F. Involuntany Dissolution: (KRSA § 271A.470)
Generally, courts are unwilling in the absence of statutory au-
thorization to assume that they have jurisdiction to dissolve corpora-
tions.221 Even when this right is given to the courts they are reluctant
to pronounce a forfeiture of a corporate charter because the judicial
goal is to preserve the corporate entity.222 Thus, the general rule has
developed that substantial performance of the conditions imposed
upon the corporation is all that is required; slight departures are over-
looked. Forfeiture will not be allowed except for a clear abuse of
209 MODEL Bus. CoRP. Ac A.N. 2D §§ 88-91 f1 2 (1971).
210 KRS § 271.520 through § 271.530.
211 KRSA § 271A.460.
212 As to the dissolved corporation's rights and liabilities see Hall v. Pilgrim
Plywood Corp., 227 A.2d 285 (Vt. 1967); Ainsley Realty Co. v. Kramer, 189 So.2d
609 (Fla. 1966); Means v. Norwood, 319 S.W.2d 817 (Tex. 1958); Addy v. Short,
89 A.2d 136 (Del. 1952): cited in H. HENN, LAW OF Co'noArmoNs 722 n.23.
213 KRSA § 271A.460(4).
214 KRSA § 271A.460(5).
215 KRSA § 271A.465(1).
216KRSA § 271A.465(1), (6).
217 KRSA § 271A.465(1) (c).
218 KRSA § 271A.465(2).
219 Id.
220 "The dissolution of a corporation . . . shall not take away or impair any
remedy available to or against such corporation, its directors, officers, or share-
holders, for any right or claim existing, or any liability incurred, prior to such
dissolution if action or other proceeding thereon is commenced within two years
after the date of such dissolution." KRSA § 271A.515.
221 Russell Box Co. v. Comm'r of Corps. & Taxation, 91 N.E.2d 750 (Mass.
1952i2 Morford v. Trustees of Middletown Academy, 13 A.2d 168 (Del. 1940).
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power or privilege resulting in the corporation's failure to fulfill its
design and purpose.223
Under KRSA § 271A.470, the power to dissolve a corporation by
judicial decree is authorized. KRSA § 271A.470, like prior law, 224
allows involuntary dissolution by circuit court decree in an action
instituted by the Attorney General225 when the corporation fails to
comply with any provision of its articles, is guilty of abuse or misuse
of any corporate power or privilege, or becomes a detriment to the
interest and welfare of the public. The burden of showing that a
corporation has committed or omitted acts which are the basis for
the forfeiture proceeding is upon the state,226 the party alleging the
forfeiture.227
Before the corporation's charter can be forfeited, there must be
neglect or wilful abuse amounting to something more than accidental
negligence, excess of power or mistake in the manner of exercising an
acknowledged power.228 Thus, it has been held that the failure of a
corporation to make its first annual report showing its financial condi-
tion is no ground for charter forfeiture when such violation of duty
is not wilful and intentional and the charter provision was complied
with in succeeding years. 229 Wilful neglect does not imply a criminal
intent; it encompasses permissive or voluntary neglect. The neglect
or refusal of a corporation to perform duties imposed on it by the
charter need not proceed from a bad or corrupt motive; it is enough
if such duties are designedly omitted.230
When corporate conduct affects the interest and welfare of the
public, it is not necessary that the wrong complained of constitute a
crime.23 1 Nor does the state have to prove actual injury to the public;
it is sufficient if the corporate act is of a nature likely to produce
such injury.23 2 However, even though grounds for forfeiture exist, the
223 See Southland v. Decimo Club, 142 A. 786 (Del. 1928); State ex tel.
Snyder v. Portland Natural Gas & Oil Co., 53 N.E. 1089 (Ind. 1899); State ex tel.
v. Family Loan Co., 73 S.W.2d 167 (Tenn. 1934).
224 KRS § 271.590.
225 Section 205 of the Kentucky Constitution also gives the Attorney General
power to revoke the charter.226 KRSA § 271A.470.
227 North & South Rolling Stock Co. v. People, 35 N.E. 608 (III. 1893).
228 Alabama ex tel. Scott v. United States Endowment & Trust Co., 37 So. 442
(Ala. 1904); Voorhies v. Walker, 198 N.W. 994 (Mich. 1924).229 State ex tel. Scott v. United States Endowment & Trust Co., 37 So. 442
(Ala. 1904).
230 People ex tel. Bishop v. Kingston & Middleton Turnpike Rd. Co., 23 Wend.
(N.Y.) 193 (Sup. Ct. 1840).
231 State v. Central Lumber Co., 123 N.W. 504 (S.D. 1909), aff'd, 226 U.S.
157 (1912).
232 People ex tel. MclIlhany v. Chicago Livestock Exch., 48 N.E. 1062 (II..
(Continued on next page)
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corporation does not forfeit its charter except as a result of a direct
adjudication. 23
G. Jurisdiction of Court to Liquidate Assets and
Business of Corporation: (KRSA § 271A.485)
At common law courts of equity were considered to have no
power, apart from statute, to order dissolution of a corporation even
in cases of deadlock or dissension in the directorate or among share-
holders.2 4 The policy which the courts followed was that corporate
dissolution was a drastic remedy that should not be lightly invoked; 235
to date, there is judicial reluctance to grant an order for dissolution
grounded on internal dissension and/or deadlock, especially while
the corporation is still thriving economically.23 6 The discussion that
follows will analyze prior case law and examine the effect of KRSA
§ 271A.475 upon Kentucky law.
One of the leading cases in Kentucky concerning deadlock is Reid
Drug Co. v. Salyer237 which held that dissolution would not be granted
even though the stockholders and directors of the corporation were
hopelessly deadlocked because the stock was equally divided be-
tween two opposing groups of shareholders and directors, neither of
which would agree to sell out to the other. Also, in Macon Lumber
Co. v. Bishop & Collins the court stated:
The appointment of a receiver for a solvent going business corpo-
ration is a drastic measure which will be taken by a court of equity
in the exercise of its discretion only where there is imminent
danger of loss to the stockholders and there is no adequate remedy
at law. Dissatisfaction with existing management and the fact
that the business is a losing venture are not sufficient to warrant a
receivership. In the absence of statutory authority, a deadlocked
condition of the stockholders and directors is not of itself, stand-
ing alone, sufficient ground for the appointment of a receiver. The
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
1897); State v. Central Lumber Co., 123 N.W. 504 (S.D. 1909), aff'd, 226 U.S.
157 (1912).
233 19 Am. JtR.2d Corporations § 1617 (1965).
234 19 Am. JuR.2d Corporations § 1610 (1965). In Oldham v. Mt. Sterling
Improvement Co., 45 S.W. 779, 780 (Ky. 1898), the Court of Appeals denied a
request for dissolution by a stockholder stating that "courts of equity have, in the
absence of statutory power, no jurisdiction over corporations for the purpose of
decreeing their dissolution."
235 Gidwitz v. Lanzit Corrugated Box Co., 170 N.E.2d 131 (IM. 1960).2 3 6 See Reid Drug Co. v. Salyer, 105 S.W.2d 625 (Ky. 1937). One com-
mentator suggests that judicial reluctance to dissolve varies in inverse proportion
to the prosperity of the company. See e.g., Israels, The Sacred Cow of Corporate
Existence: Problems of Deadlock and Dissolution, 19 U. Cm. L. RBv. 778, 785
(1952).
237 105 S.W.2d 625 (Ky. 1937).
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general rule is that a receiver will not be appointed unless it ap-
pears that the appointment is necessary either to prevent fraud or
to save the property from irreparable injury or threatened loss or
destruction.288
Unlike prior law, KRSA § 271A.475(1)(a)(1), (2) and (3)
delineate three specific situations which the courts should consider
when granting or denying dissolution in actions brought by share-
holders: (1) "directors are ddadlocked in the management.. . and the
shareholders are unable to break the deadlock . . . and irreparable
injury to the corporation is being suffered or is threatened;" (2) "the
acts of the directors or those in control ... are illegal or fraudulent,"
and (3) "a deadlock exists, and the shareholders have failed for at
least two consecutive annual meetings to elect successors to directors
whose terms have or would have expired."
With respect to the third guideline above, in Strong v. Fromm
Laboratories, Inc., 23 9 the Wisconsin Supreme Court, interpreting a
provision identical to Kentucky's, held that all that was necessary for
dissolution was a showing that the shareholders were deadlocked
and could not elect a successor to fill a director vacancy for two
consecutive meetings. The court reasoned that because a showing of
"irreparable injury to the corporation" was a prerequisite to dissolution
under the deadlocked directorate provision, the absence of this require-
ment in the shareholder deadlock provision precluded consideration
of benefit or detriment to the shareholders. Since the by-laws pro-
hibited the board of directors from transacting any business as long
as the shareholders failed to appoint a successor, the court also found
that no one else could manage the business and thus dissolution was
the only alternative. The court interpreted only the third test of the
Kentucky statute240 and found it exclusive and independent of the
first241 and second 242 guidelines. The Strong case thus appears to stand
for the proposition that if a deadlock exists and successors have not
been elected for two consecutive meetings, the court has no discretion
but must grant dissolution.
However, in Jackson v. Nicolai-Neppach Co.,243 the Oregon Su-
preme Court construed the identical provision and reached a contrary
result. The Oregon court was unimpressed with the Wisconsin Court's
reasoning and held that the presence or absence of benefit to the
238 229 F.2d 305, 307 (6th Cir. 1956).
239 77 N.W.2d 389 (Wis. 1956).
240KRSA § 271A.475(1)(a)(3).
241 KRSA § 271A.475(1) (a) (1).
242 KRSA § 271A.475(1)(a) (2).
243 348 P.2d 9 (Ore. 1959).
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shareholders should be considered. The court felt that KRSA §
271A(1)(a)(8) and (1)(a)(1) should be read together and that
(1)(a)(1) suggested that benefit or detriment to the shareholders
should be considered whereas the Wisconsin court was of the opinion
that (1)(a)(8) represented a deliberate attempt to avoid the limita-
tion of (1)(a)(1). 244 If the Kentucky courts determine that the
purpose of subsection (1)(a)(8) is to protect the shareholder's right
to participate in management, then the Wisconsin construction appears
correct and should be followed in Kentucky.245
The second dissolution guideline, KIRSA § 271A.475(1) (a) (2),
provides that dissolution will be granted if "the acts of the directors
or those in control of the corporation are illegal or fradulent."246 It
has been held, for example, that where negligence and gross misman-
agement of corporate property results in loss to the shareholders, or
where directors and/or officers are misapplying corporate property,
the shareholders are entitled to sue for dissolution.247
With respect to the requirement in KRSA § 271A.475 (1) (a) (1)
that before dissolution may be granted "irreparable injury to the
corporation" 248 must be established, it has been held under similar
statutes that the threat of irreparable injury at the time the action
is brought is sufficient.249 It has also been suggested that irreparable
injury may relate to a "continued course of action."250 However,
because of the difficulty of defining "irreparable injury," the fact
situation in each particular controversy must be evaluated and, thus,
no general rule can be stated.2
51
244 For a more comprehensive discussion and comparison see Ham, Sug-
gestions for Modernizing the Kentucky General Corporation Law to Meet the Needs
of Close Corporations, 52 Ky. L.J. 527 (1964).
245 Id. citing Israels, The Sacred Cow of Corporate Existence: Problems of
Deadlock and Dissolution, 19 U. Cm. L. REv. 776, 778 (1952).246It should be noted that the Kentucky Act intentionally eliminated the
word "oppressive" from the statute because of the difficulties that might have
arisen due to its vagueness.
247 19 Am. Jun.2d Corporations § 1604 (1965).
248 This phrase does not mean such an injury as is beyond the possibility of
repair, or beyond possible compensation in damages, or necessarily great damage,
but includes an injury, whether great or small, which ought not to be submitted
to, on the one hand, or inflicted, on the other; and which, because it is so large or
so small, or is of such constant and frequent occurrence, or because no certain
pecuniary standard exists for the measurement of damages, cannot receive reason-
able redress in a court of law. BLAcK's LAw DsrcxoN ny 924 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).249 Handlan v. Handlan, 232 S.W.2d 944 (Mo. 1950).
250 Note, Oppression As a Basis for Dissolving a Solvent Corporation, 30 U.
Cn~i. L. BEv. 478, 482 (1961). A "continuing course of action" is defined as a
frequent and constant occurrence that, while not necessarily causing injury now
to the corporation, will eventually result in irreparable injury if such occurrence
continues.
251 A comprehensive examination of the law concerning dissension and dead-
lock is found in Annot., 13 A.L.R.2d 1260 (1950).
1972]
KENTucKY LAw JouRNAL.
It appears that KRSA § 271A.475 should be interpreted to allow
dissolution of the corporate form more readily than the old law
allowed.2 52 This is especially true for deadlock and stalemate in the
close corporations2 53 since such corporations are often compared with
the partnership form of business254 in which it is possible for any
general partner to compel a dissolution at any time, regardless of
whether the fixed term for existence has expired or the business is
profitable. For example, the Uniform Partnership Act lists situations
which will justify an order of dissolution:
A partner has been guilty of such conduct as tends to affect
prejudicially the carrying on of the business;
A partner wilfully or persistently commits a breach of the part-
nership agreement, or otherwise so conducts himself in matters re-
lating to the partnership business that it is not reasonably prac-
ticable to carry on the business in partnership with him;
The business of the partnership can only be carried on at a loss;
Other circumstances which render a dissolution equitable. 255
Realizing that the close corporation is in essence an "incorporated
partnership," it is suggested that the Kentucky courts may, under the
new act, use the partnership analogy to terminate the corporate
existence of the close corporation when the business is no longer
"workable or advantageous" to the shareholders due to dissension and
deadlock.2 55 Furthermore, recognizing the importance of management
participation to members of the close corporation,25' the partnership-
close corporation analogy should prove more valid, and dissolution
should be more liberally granted. The new act seems to apply this
liberal policy; under the old law25 8 approval of at least 50%, of the
shareholders was required in order to request dissolution whereas
under the new law any shareholder may request it.259
H. Procedure in Liquidation of Corporation
by Court: (KRSA §§ 271A.480-271A.505)
The equity courts, historically, created their own rules in the
2 52 See MoDEL Bus CoR,. Acr ANN. 2) § 97 f 12 (1971).
253 It has been stated that a "close corporation" is one in which, regardless
of the distribution of the shareholders, "management and ownership are sub-
stantially identical." Israels, The Close Corporation and the Law, 33 CoNm=L L.
Bxv. 482, 488 (1948).2 54 Israels, The Sacred Cow of Corporate Existence: Problems of Deadlock and
Dissolution, 19 U.Cm. L. Prv. 776, 789 (1952).
255 UNIFORM PARTNEStsmp AcT § 32(e)-(f) (1969).
256 Israels, supra note 254, at 789-90.
257 Petition of Collins-Doan Co. v. Collins, 70 A.2d 159 (N.J. 1949) (petitionfor dissolution).
25 8 KRS § 271.570(20).
259 KRSA § 271A.475.
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absence of specific procedural statutes concerning the exercise of
power to liquidate the assets and business of a corporation.260 Under
the new act the rules for court liquidation, from the initiation of the
proceedings through the filing of the final decree of dissolution, are
statutorily set forth in KRSA §§ 271A.480-271A.505. KRSA § 271A.490
provides that the creditor's claims in liquidation proceedings must be
filed either with the clerk of the court or with the receiver no later
than four months from the date of the court order requiring such
filings, unless the court extends the time.261 The new act requires
completion of the liquidation process prior to the entry of the final
decree of dissolution. 262
Kentucky's old law had provisions comparable to the Kentucky Act
regarding the procedure in liquidation of a corporation by the court.263
KRSA § 271A.480 concerns the appointment of the receiver with the
usual powers granted.264 KRSA § 271A.485 and KRS 271.560 are
identical except that the old law required that the natural persons
who were appointed receivers be residents of Kentucky; there is no
such requirement under the new act.
The courts have wide discretion in the appointment of receivers.265
However, the Supreme Court has set forth a principle which states
that there should be no "friendly" receivership (i.e., a person interested
in the action) because the receiver is an officer of the court and, there-
fore, should be as free from "friendliness" to the parties as the court
itself.266
The old law provided that dissolution could be discontinued as
the result of compromise or reorganization by approval of three-fourths
of the creditors or shareholders.267 The new act allows such proceed-
ings to be dismissed when the cause for liquidation no longer exists.266
Upon such court dismissal, the receiver must re-deliver to the corpora-
tion all of its remaining propert3, and assets.2 69 Should the liquidation
process not be discontinued, the Kentucky Act provides that upon
payment of all debts, obligations and liabilities of the corporation, as
260 MODEL BUs. Conp. ACT ANN. 2D §§ 98-103 (1971).
261 KRSA § 271A.490 of the new act is identical to IRS § 271.565 of the old
lav.
262 KRSA § 271A.490.
263 Compare KRS §§ 271.555-271.575 with KRSA §§ 271A.480-271A.606.
264 "A receiver of a corporation appointed under the provisions of this section
shall have authority to sue and defend in all courts in his own name as receiver
of such corporation." KRSA § 271A.480.2 6 5 Dinsmore v. Barker, 212 P. 1109 (Utah 1923).
266 Harkin v. Brundage, 276 U.S. 36 (1928).
267 KtS § 271.555(3).




far as possible, the court shall issue a decree dissolving the corpora-
lion, whereupon the existence of the corporation ceases.2 70 The clerk
of the court issuing such decree has the duty of flMing a certified copy
of the decree with the clerk of the county court of the county in which
the registered office of the corporation is situated.27 '
I. Deposit of Distributive Portion of Amount Due
Unknown Persons: (KRSA § 271A.510)
The Kentucky Act, in substance, is the same as Kentucky's prior
law.2 72 KRSA § 271A. 510 provides that if upon the voluntary or invol-
untary dissolution of a corporation a shareholder is entitled to a
distributive portion and cannot be found, the receiver having control
of the distribution shall deposit such distributive portion with the
Department of Revenue along with a written report of the names and
last known address of such persons if known.27 3 The shareholder's
rights of recovery are the same as those of claimants of abandoned
property.274 If the receiver fails to deposit such portion with the
Department of Revenue, he will be held personally liable for the
total amount.2 75
J. Survival of Remedy After Dissolution: (KRSA § 271A.515)
At common law, the dissolution of a corporation terminated its
legal existence. After the dissolution and termination of the existence
of a corporation, no action could be maintained against it and con-
versely, it lacked capacity to sue.276 In order to mitigate the sometime
harsh consequences resulting from the doctrine, courts of equity began
to allow suits to be brought against directors and shareholders on the
principle of "tracing the funds" of the corporation after dissolution into
their hands.277 To circumvent this, jurisdictions adopted statutes which
allowed actions to be brought against or by the dissolved corporation
and which generally prevented actions from abating upon dissolu-
tion.278
In Kentucky, the statutory power for survival of remedy under the
270 KRSA § 271A.500.
271 KRSA § 271A.515.
272 Compare KRSA § 271A.510 with KRS § 271.580.
273 KRSA § 271A.510(1). Once the property is delivered to the Department
of Revenue, the owner is not entitled to receive income or other increments
occurring thereafter (KRS § 393.025).
274 KRSA § 271A.510(3).
275 KRSA § 271A.510(4).
276 19 Am. Jua.2d Corporations § 1662, at 1009 (1965).
277 MODEL Bus. Corn. AcT ANN. 2D § 105 ff 2 (1971).
278 Id.
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old law was KRS § 271.585 and is now KRSA § 271A.515. The new law
provides that dissolution on expiration of the corporation's period of
duration does not take away or impair any remedy, action, etc.
available to or against the corporation, its directors, officers or share-
holders for two years from the date of dissolution.279 A case interpret-
ing a similar statute has announced the principle that a corporation
remains liable on contracts made before it became defunct.2 0 It is
also liable for injuries resulting from torts committed before or after
its dissolution.28' Furthermore, liquidation of a corporation does not
extinguish obligations owed by the corporation or obligations owed
to it.282
The two-year limit found in KRSA § 271A.515 appears not to apply
to shareholders individually, for it was held in Levy v. Liebling 83 that
the statute limiting the time within which the corporation could bring
suit after dissolution did not apply to shareholders who succeed to
all assets of the corporation.. In that case the shareholders were suing
a judgment debtor of a Kentucky corporation after expiration of the
two-year period.
CONCLUSION
The foregoing discussion of the fundamental corporate changes of
amendments to articles, merger, consolidation, sale of assets and dis-
solution has been an attempt to provide the practicing attorney with
a workable guide to major differences between Kentucky's prior and
new corporate law. Because of the breadth of this article, the most
important changes initiated by the new act are difficult to ascertain.
However, those changes relating to class voting, amendments to the
articles, mergers of subsidiary corporations and jurisdiction of the
courts to liquidate the assets and business in event of deadlock or
dissension appear to be of major significance.
The Kentucky Act regarding fundamental corporate changes ap-
pears to be a comprehensive body of corporate regulations which is
pro-business in its outlook. It embodies the approach Kentucky must
assume if it is to remain a viable contender for corporate development
within the state.
Michael V. Withrow
270 KRSA § 271A.515.280 Bowe v. Minnesota Milk Co., 47 N.W. 151 (Minn. 1890).
281 Miller's Adm'x v. Newburg Orrel Coal Co., 8 S.E. 600 (W. Va. 1888).
282 United States v. Lam, 26 F.2d 830 (6th Cir. 1927); Hauger v. Intl
Trading Co., 214 S.W. 438 (Ky. 1919); Castles Adm'r v. Acrogen Coal Co., 140
S.W. 1034 (Ky. 1911).
283 238 F.2d 505 (7th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 936 (1957).
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